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Still Europeanised? Greek Foreign Policy 
During the Eurozone Crisis
 
Angelos Chryssogelos1 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This working paper examines tendencies in Greek foreign policy during the Eurozone crisis. 
Existing analyses of the impact of the crisis on Greek foreign policy have focused primarily on its 
fiscal/economic effects. Here I shift the focus to the question whether the Europeanisation of 
Greek foreign policy has been affected by the crisis. Given that the EU has been the main 
strategic anchor of Greek foreign policy since the late-1990s, and that the Eurozone crisis put 
into question the overall alignment of Greece with Europe, the question of foreign policy 
Europeanization under conditions of a major crisis of EU governance remains surprisingly 
understudied. Apart from the mainstream foreign policy Europeanization literature, I also draw 
on critical works that view Europeanization as a process that de-politicizes state-society 
relations in Europe and insulates policymakers from public scrutiny. In this framework, I 
conceptualize the Eurozone crisis as a factor of re-politicization, opening policymaking (incl. in 
foreign policy) to contestation by mobilized political communities. I apply this conceptualization 
to the study of Greece’s Balkan and energy security policy between 2010 and 2015.  
The findings point to contradictory effects of the crisis on Greek foreign policy. Pro-EU 
governments in this period largely maintained the EU framework as their reference, but sought 
to project more forcefully national interests within it to demonstrate the usefulness of the EU 
for Greek goals and deflect public pressure. An anti-austerity coalition that came to power in 
early 2015 sought more forcefully to re-politicize some aspects of Greek foreign policy as part 
of its efforts to ‘renegotiate’ Greece’s relationship with the Eurozone. At the same time 
however, the overall image of Europeanized Greek foreign policy remained largely unaltered 
under the Syriza-ANEL coalition, and continuity was even more emphatic after it signed a new 
bailout agreement with the EU in the summer of 2015. The overall image then is one of 
continuity that however emerged out of a period of contestation that revealed deep tensions in 
what had always been an imperfect and instrumental embedding of Greek foreign policy in the 
EU framework. A de-Europeanization and re-politicization effect in 2010-15 crisis gave place to 
a renewed foreign policy practice within the EU framework, one however that is even more 
transparently than during the pre-crisis era the outcome of instrumental and national interest 
calculations. Europe remains the most effective and most readily available tool of Greek foreign 
policy, albeit one burdened with even more contradictions than in the past. 
Keywords:  
Greek foreign policy; Europeanization; state transformation; politicization; Balkans; energy
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines how the relationship between Greek foreign policy and the EU has 
evolved in the years since Greece entered a prolonged economic and political crisis in 
2010. Scholarship of Greek foreign policy showed early interest in the impact of the 
Eurozone crisis on Greece’s external relations. Yet the focus was mostly on the financial 
constraints on Greek foreign policy (Kouskouvelis 2012; Tziampiris 2013). But as the 
economic crisis unleashed a debate about Greece’s overall relationship with Europe, 
enquiring about whether and how Greek foreign policy can remain seamlessly aligned 
to its main strategic anchor of the last 20 years becomes an important question.  
 
From an analytical perspective, an obvious frame through which to answer this question 
is the foreign policy Europeanisation literature that has been somewhat dormant since 
a cascade of interest in the 2000s. The cautious conclusion of the most recent 
comprehensive collection of texts on the issue was that ‘there is a trend, albeit broad 
and slow, towards convergence [even if it is] stronger at the level of procedure and of 
general orientation than it is at the level of detailed policy’ (Wong and Hill 2012: 232). 
But that volume covered developments only up to the eruption of the Eurozone crisis.  
 
Comparative analyses of the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the Europeanisation of 
national foreign policies have begun to appear. A recent journal special issue that 
explores this question in Southern member states is an important addition (Stavridis et 
al 2015). The case study of Greece explored the ways the economic crisis increased 
domestic resistances to EU pressure for reform of policymaking structures in the area of 
economic diplomacy (Tsardanidis 2015). Here, I aim to broaden the research focus to 
include the political and societal context of foreign policy in Greece. This is a point 
acknowledged by Stavridis et al (2015) in their discussion of a ‘double [democratic] 
deficit’ in foreign policy, usually far removed from public scrutiny not only at the EU but 
also the national level. 
 
Consequently, this paper will move beyond the mainstream Europeanisation literature 
and will draw on critical perspectives on state transformation under the influence of EU 
membership. Building on this, I view Europeanisation of foreign policy as a process of 
de-politicisation of national policymaking via its transference to a supranational setting 
occupied by political and administrative elite networks. Europeanisation is not a neutral 
process of institutional change, but it signals fundamental shifts in long-standing 
arrangements linking the state with society. Viewed in this way, Europeanisation of 
foreign policy is one dimension of a broader phenomenon, namely state transformation 
under EU membership, and the Eurozone crisis is a juncture in which the 
accommodation between the state and the EU can well become re-politicised in areas 
beyond the economy.  
 
This paper examines the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy during the crisis in two 
policy areas, one regional (relations with the Western Balkans) and one thematic 
(energy security). These are areas of high salience for EU and Greek foreign policy, and 
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they both experienced significant developments since 2010. The analysis shows that the 
Eurozone crisis challenged the Europeanised patterns of Greek foreign policy, mirroring 
the rapid loss of legitimacy of pro-EU elites and the emergence of Euroscepticism in 
Greece (Clements et al 2014). But, as the unfolding of the crisis forced the anti-austerity 
camp to accept the conditions of the financing of the Greek state by the EU, Greek 
foreign policy’s alignment with EU policymaking processes and priorities was reasserted.  
 
 
2. Europeanisation as De-Politicisation 
 
‘Europeanisation’ is one of the most used concepts in EU studies (Cowles et al 2001; 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002). It denotes the impact of the EU on a 
state’s domestic institutions, policymaking structures, and politics (Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003; Goetz and Hix 2000). Europeanisation thus takes place in a range of policy 
areas, and comparative analyses of Europeanisation have indeed examined the cross-
policy impact of EU membership.  
 
The current conjuncture in EU politics however, with the Eurozone crisis brewing since 
2010, followed by the migration crisis and Brexit in 2015-16, creates the need to study 
the transformation of the European state under EU membership in a way that 
acknowledges the political and contested nature of this phenomenon – thus allowing 
also to examine how foreign policy Europeanisation may be affected when the 
relationship between EU and member states becomes tense in other policy areas. 
Europeanisation of foreign policy does not just signify policy change, but it rather 
represents a deep transformation in an area that has long been considered synonymous 
with modern statehood.  
Here, I draw on Bickerton’s conceptualisation of Europeanised foreign policy as a 
dimension of state transformation in Europe from the nation-state to the ‘member 
state’ (Bickerton 2011, 2015). This transformation reflects a process of insulation of 
political and administrative elites from domestic societal constraints. Whereas in the 
nation-state sovereignty is exercised with reference to a territorially defined political 
community, member states legitimise their rule with reference to their elites’ 
participation in arenas of negotiation and consensus seeking among likeminded experts 
in EU institutions (Bickerton 2015: 54-55).  
The transformation of nation-states into member-states developed in parallel with the 
emergence of a hybrid form of integration combining supranational with 
intergovernmental characteristics. As it tried to promote integration in areas close to 
national sovereignty, the EU developed since Maastricht, next to the supranational first 
pillar, modes of governance that rely on the voluntary coordination of national 
governments. Thus, it has increased the ‘intergovernmental character’ of policymaking 
in the EU, ‘mitigated by a process of socialisation between national civil servants and 
ministers’ (Fabbrini 2014: 178). Works that see this mode of integration reflected 
primarily in the work of technocrats and experts describe it as ‘intensive 
transgovernmentalism’ (Wallace and Wallace 2007). Scholars who focus on the 
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increased role of national political leaders in EU settings, like the European Council, 
speak of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Puetter 2014). 
 
Foreign policy in Europe is more Europeanised than what a formal reading of EU foreign 
policy as intergovernmental veto-driven area would suggest. EU institutions have 
expanded their capacity since the 1980s, forming an institutional and ideational arena 
that influences the conduct of national foreign policies (Wong and Hill 2012: 218). 
Foreign policy in the EU is a dense field, containing intergovernmental institutional 
characteristics but within a thick framework of norms and practices that, filtered 
through national interest calculations, inform the style and content of national foreign 
policy (Alecu de Flers and Müller 2012; Smith 2004; Wong and Hill 2012: 9). As a result, 
foreign policy Europeanisation is characterised by complexity and contingency (Wong 
and Hill 2012: 4-5).  
 
Procedurally, national diplomats have become accustomed to informing other EU 
partners about their views and movements – the so-called ‘coordination reflex’ (Glarbo 
1999). Foreign policy style also adapts to the EU preference for liberal and pacified 
international politics. Sometimes seen as a ‘modernisation’ effect (Wong and Hill 2012: 
8), this adaptation causes members to align their rhetoric and foreign policy instruments 
to those of the EU. Europeanisation can also induce member-states to look in the EU 
solutions to challenges they would otherwise tackle alone (Economides 2005: 472-482; 
Moumoutzis 2011: 619). Finally, national foreign policy may be Europeanised when 
member-states must formulate positions on international issues on which they have 
little interest or expertise, but which the EU is becoming involved in (Nasra 2011; Wong 
and Hill 2012: 215).  
 
Central to the mainstream literature on foreign policy Europeanisation are the concepts 
of ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’. Downloading refers to member-states adopting EU 
norms, practices, styles, modes of foreign policymaking and, ultimately, formulations of 
goals and interests. In this sense, ‘Europeanisation’ concerns EU-induced change at the 
national level. The second aspect of EU/member-state interaction is the projection of 
national interests to the European level and the foreign policy outputs of the EU to 
achieve national goals more effectively – ‘uploading’.  
 
The highest level of EU impact on national foreign policies is when national foreign 
policies become sincere propagators of EU interests and values – ‘socialisation’ (Larsen 
2014: 371). In practice, however, national foreign policies in Europe maintain a 
significant degree of instrumentality in their engagement with the EU. Socialisation may 
come about through interactions in bureaucratic settings (e.g. between diplomats in 
Brussels), and this informs the coordination and information sharing ‘reflex’ that makes 
up a major part of observable Europeanisation (Wong and Hill 2012: 10).  
 
But member-states can also approach the EU framework with national goals and 
preferences in mind. For some authors, states adopt EU norms, values and formulations 
of interest precisely because they see them as beneficial for the attainment of specific 
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national goals (Moumoutzis 2011: 622-624; Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). Generally, 
this analytical divide between sincere and instrumental Europeanisation – when the one 
or the other occurs, and which one is strongest – is a central problematique of the 
mainstream literature on EU Europeanisation. 
But Bickerton’s framework goes beyond a binary view of foreign policy Europeanisation 
as an empirical or analytical choice between unabashed pursuit of national interests and 
sincere adherence to EU norms. Elite negotiations are spaces within which uploading 
and downloading take place. But while member states have preferences and interests, 
the EU is a space within which the practice of national foreign policy is transformed 
under the pressure of routines, communication and interaction at the expert level 
(Bickerton 2011: 180-181). Thus, Europeanisation of national foreign policy is an aspect 
of overall state transformation in Europe. In foreign policy as in other policy areas, state 
sovereignty has disaggregated in the ‘curious drifting apart of politics and bureaucracy’, 
with elites conducting policy in EU institutions while political communities become 
deprived of their capacity for control and scrutiny (Bickerton 2015: 58).  
 
 
 
3. Crisis as Re-Politicisation 
 
Just like economic policymaking, foreign policy has increasingly become depoliticised by 
political and administrative elites who prioritise technical negotiation in supranational 
settings amongst themselves (Bickerton 2011). Thus, Europeanisation of foreign policy 
raises normative questions similar to those that emerged during the Eurozone crisis: 
how deepening integration constrains the options of national governments; how the 
mutual monitoring of elites at the supranational level helps them escape domestic 
scrutiny; how national representative politics is becoming depoliticised via deliberations 
on the supranational level (Schmidt 2006) etc. 
The Eurozone crisis has been viewed as a challenge to democratic politics in Europe. The 
ways bailouts divided the EU into creditors and debtors and ‘called into question the 
principle of voluntary coordination’ (Fabbrini 2014: 192) made evident that the space 
for independent national policymaking had been reduced by the commonly agreed rules 
and policies of economic governance in the EU. Consequently, the Eurozone crisis has 
been linked with reaction to this abrupt and visible loss of national sovereignty, 
expressed in the rise of protest politics (Kaldor and Selchow 2013) and 
populist/Eurosceptic parties. 
 
Generally governance crises like the Eurozone and migration crises can be seen as crises 
of state transformation in Europe that politicise the passage from the nation-state to 
the member state as conceptualised by Bickerton (2015). They are accentuated 
expressions of the EU’s ‘state of disequilibrium’ since Maastricht: as national 
representative politics cannot anymore control and hold accountable political and 
administrative elites embedded in sheltered settings of supranational deliberation, 
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popular disenchantment with integration increases (Bickerton et al 2015). Resistance to 
further disaggregation of representative politics from administration and elite 
interactions extends to other policy areas if they are also seen as insulated from scrutiny 
and overtly unrepresentative. The rise of populist parties (anti-immigration in the North, 
anti-austerity in the South) and the Brexit vote in 2016 are tangible consequences of this 
‘state of disequilibrium’. 
 
This perspective dovetails with the key insight in the mainstream Europeanisation 
literature that domestic politics is a major determining factor of EU’s influence in 
member-states, countries in the EU’s enlargement zone, and states in the 
neighbourhood (Pridham 2002; Schimmelfenning 2005; Vachudova 2014). The role of 
party politics is also addressed in the literature on foreign policy Europeanisation (Smith 
2004: 752), yet, as in most other parts of the Europeanisation literature, it has received 
scant attention (Carbone and Quartapelle 2015: 4; Ladrech 2010). This may be because 
up until recently party politics in most European countries revolved around a centripetal 
right-left competition that did not offer itself to contestation of foreign policy (Wong 
and Hill 2012: 216-217).  
An effect of the Eurozone crisis on foreign policy Europeanisation is the change of the 
domestic context and the increased partisan and ideological contestation of foreign 
policy and its alignment with Europe. In EU states severely hit by the economic crisis like 
Greece party competition has realigned around the question of their relationship with 
the EU, thus making Europeanisation itself a stake of party competition (Bickerton 2015: 
60; Katsanidou and Otjes 2015). Parties demanding more popular control over policy 
outputs will normally question the adaptation of national foreign policy to the norms 
and processes of the EU framework and will pursue narrowly defined national goals; and 
pro-European parties will maintain reference to the EU, but be increasingly forced to 
demonstrate that EU integration serves national interests (Juncos and Whitman 2015). 
In this challenging context, the renewed awareness of the tensions between national 
interests and the coordination outcomes achieved by elites in EU settings should 
produce a slow veering away from features of EU foreign policy that a national foreign 
policy had internalised – a process described as ‘de-Europeanisation’ (Stavridis et al 
2015; Wong and Hill 2012: 214). There will be less patience, of governments and public 
opinions alike, with the demands of EU membership. Uploading becomes less frequent 
or more contentious, as member-states will be more intransigent with regards to the 
preferences they want to see reflected in EU foreign policy outputs. A weaker EU foreign 
policy in turn reflects back on the national level, as EU rules, norms, practices and 
prescriptions that national foreign policies can take recourse to become poorer – i.e. 
downloading becomes weaker.  
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4. Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy as Aspect of State 
Transformation 
A view of Europeanised foreign policy as depoliticised consensus-driven technocratic 
policy pursued among elites and experts of EU member states allows us to conceptualise 
Greece’s Europeanised foreign policy since the late-1990s as a conscious effort by Greek 
elites to shelter themselves from a society that had traditionally been very energised 
over foreign policy; as a way to depoliticise and reformulate political and public debate 
around foreign policy without compromising core interests of Greece; and as a way to 
underpin a project of state transformation by demonstrating its effectiveness in a policy 
area most associated with traditional conceptions of sovereignty. 
Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy in the late 1990s was never dissociated from a 
broader project of ‘modernisation’ of the Greek state (Economides 2005: 475-476). It 
took place at a time of a conscious decision to anchor Greece to the hard core of 
European integration, chiefly by participating in the budding Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) (Ioakimidis 2000). The links between Europeanisation of domestic 
structures and foreign policy were more than symbolic. For the first 15 years of its EU 
membership, Greece was seen as a problematic partner due to its insistence in 
importing its difficult foreign policy issues to Community proceedings. Greek public 
opinion was also divided, aspiring to join the ‘civilised West’ but also being unsure of the 
degree to which Greece’s allies understood and supported its interests (Tsakonas 2010; 
Tsardanidis 2015). Foreign policy always had the potential to disrupt domestic politics 
and Greece’s relations with the EU (as had happened e.g. with the mobilisation in the 
early-90s over the Macedonia name-issue). 
Domestic and foreign policy Europeanisation proceeded in parallel but closely 
intertwined. In the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 Greece accepted 
Turkey as EU accession candidate (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012). This change was 
presented domestically as a sophisticated way to pursue the national interest, as Greece 
would make use of the leverage of EU foreign policy to apply conditionality on Turkey 
(Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). The success of making Greek policy goals part of EU 
considerations allowed the Greek government to legitimise alignment with Europe. But 
the relationship worked the other way around as well: Europeanisation of foreign policy 
drew on the popularity of modernisation of domestic structures to be justified. At the 
time a majority of Greek public opinion was opposed to Turkish EU membership 
(Tsakonas 2010: 216). Yet the prospect of positive domestic change via the EU was so 
popular that a foreign policy change presented as commensurate with Greece’s entry to 
the Eurozone was easily accepted.  
Europeanisation of Greece’s Balkan policy, whereby it saw its political and security 
considerations best served by the Western Balkans’ EU accession, was less controversial 
but still entailed tensions. Given how much Greece was seen as a difficult EU member 
during the Yugoslav wars due to its attachment to Serbia, and also given its historically 
and diplomatically delicate relations with Albania, Kosovo and FYROM, the choice of 
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Greek elites to pursue relations (and leverage) with the Balkans via the framework of EU 
(and NATO) enlargement (Mavromatidis 2010: 55) contributed to the depoliticisation of 
this part of Greek foreign policy as well. 
Greece’s alignment to Europe during the 2000s was supported by a convergent and 
stable two-party system dominated by pro-EU parties (Pappas 2001). The competition 
between the centre-left PASOK and the centre-right New Democracy effectively 
preempted any contestation of the domestic agenda of modernisation and the external 
agenda of Europeanised foreign policy (Chryssogelos 2015). And yet, cracks had begun 
to appear in this consensus already some years before the Eurozone crisis. In domestic 
politics, there were increasing signs in 2007-08 that the two major parties were losing 
their hold over Greek society (Voulgaris and Nicolacopoulos 2014).  
In foreign policy, already in 2008 developments in the policy areas examined in this 
paper demonstrated that the equilibrium of Europeanised foreign policy was becoming 
shakier2. The government of New Democracy vetoed FYROM’s entry into NATO and 
made resolution of the name dispute a precondition for FYROM beginning EU accession 
negotiations (Mavromatidis 2010: 52, 56-57). It also initiated an activist energy policy by 
partaking in a Russian-backed pipeline project connecting the Bulgarian Black Sea coast 
with the Aegean Sea. Both moves were popular with public opinion even though they 
were in tension with the European framework of Greek foreign policy. As mainstream 
politics were becoming increasingly challenged already before the crisis, big parts of 
Greek society did not recognise themselves in the Europeanised member state Greece 
had become.  
With the advent of the Eurozone crisis, these pre-existing tendencies intensified. The 
years after 2010 were a period of rabid contestation not just of austerity but also of 
Europeanised state-society relations in Greece more generally. The focus of this 
contestation was of course the economy, but, as has been well documented, anti-
austerity politics in Greece did not just concern economic preferences, but also included 
visions of nationalism (Halikiopoulou et. al. 2012) and radical demands for unmediated 
representation of popular demands (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). In essence, 
austerity brought about a re-politicisation of a whole range of state-society relations 
that, under the influence of EU membership, had entailed (or intended) the insulation 
of Greek political and administrative elites. As foreign policy had traditionally been a 
prominent topic of public contestation in Greece, it would be normal for it to become 
subject to renewed scrutiny and politicisation as the Europeanisation of the Greek state 
became contested.  
 
 
                                                     
2 Interview with Greek foreign policy expert, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
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5. Greek Foreign Policy and the Balkans: From Thwarted to 
Inadvertent Europeanisation 
In October 2009 the centre-left PASOK won a snap election and formed a new 
government led by George Papandreou, foreign minister in the governments that 
between 1996 and 2004 instituted Greek foreign policy’s turn towards Europe. 
Papandreou was one of the architects of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy, and 
upon assuming office he sought to reenergise the initiatives that PASOK had promoted 
before its electoral defeat in 2004.  
Papandreou had been one of the main promoters of the Western Balkans’ ‘European 
perspective’ in the early 2000s and was well known to be a moderate in the question of 
FYROM’s name. In Skopje there was optimism that, with him in power, Greece would 
soften its stance on the question of FYROM’s membership of NATO and the EU3. But 
these hopes were mirrored by fears in Greece that, as the country was entering 
economic tutelage, international pressure would spill over into questions of foreign 
policy and would force Greece into painful compromises. These fears were informed by 
older tendencies in Greek society that mistrusted the adaptation of Greek foreign policy 
to the norms, style and tone of EU foreign policy. 
These hopes and fears were not unfounded. Apparently, Papandreou explored the 
potential of a solution4 and moderated Greece’s stance towards Skopje in 2009-10, 
frequently meeting with FYROM’s Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski5. Perhaps not unlike 
his own efforts to change important aspects of Greek foreign policy at the time of 
Greece’s convergence towards EMU in the late 1990s, Papandreou saw again foreign 
policy as linked with Greece’s renewed effort to remain anchored to the euro amidst a 
mounting financial crisis6. But for the anti-austerity front, that combined a rhetoric of 
economic justice with a patriotic (even nationalistic) logic, this linkage worked in the 
opposite way: any compromise on foreign policy was not seen as a way to reaffirm 
Greece’s European orientation, but the result of undue pressures at a time of weakness. 
This linkage was forcefully articulated by the new leader of New Democracy Antonis 
Samaras. Samaras’ political career was inextricably tied with the Macedonian question, 
as it was he as foreign minister who in the early 1990s put forth a hardline policy of non-
recognition of Skopje that ultimately led to his split from New Democracy. Having 
returned to the party in 2004, Samaras won a surprise victory in its leadership primary 
in 2009. Even more surprisingly, when Papandreou brought the bailout and austerity 
program to parliament in 2010, New Democracy voted against it, despite its long 
pedigree as a pro-European party. For 18 months in 2010-11, New Democracy under 
                                                     
3 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016. 
4 According to a European diplomat compromise was much nearer than what was then reported, but 
Gruevski stepped back. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 14 May 2016. 
5 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016. Interview with Greek diplomat, 
Athens, 13 June 2016. 
6 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
  
 
11 
Samaras became the main exponent of the ‘anti-memorandum’ camp. Samaras made 
the link between foreign policy and the economic crisis explicit: in a debate in parliament 
devoted to foreign policy in January 2011 for example, he warned Papandreou that he 
would never acquiesce to compromises on foreign policy due to outside pressure on 
economic matters7.  
As the crisis and political volatility in Greece deepened from 2011 onwards however, the 
dynamics changed. Diplomatic observers of developments at the time are in agreement 
that Greece managed to effectively shelter itself from pressures to be more 
accommodative towards FYROM precisely because its governments were facing such a 
domestic uproar over austerity. With the EU interested first and foremost in Greece 
making it through its reform program, the appetite for initiatives in other fronts 
decreased8.  
The changing nature of the Greek party system also contributed to this. Until 2011 party 
competition was dominated by two big pro-European parties. After 2011 Greece 
experienced successively a technocratic government, a caretaker government, and 
finally in 2012 the rise to power of a pro-austerity, ideologically heterogeneous coalition 
facing an anti-austerity opposition made up of radical far-left and far-right forces. 
Fragmentation and polarisation meant that there was very little political space for 
compromises in foreign policy. Thus, as far as relations with FYROM were concerned, 
the crisis had the paradoxical effect of sheltering Greece from further EU pressures to 
depart from its long-held positions9. The consumption of Greece and its EU partners with 
the crisis probably contributed to Greece sustaining any pressure created by a ruling of 
the ICJ in late 2011 in favour of FYROM concerning Greece’s veto of FYROM’s entry to 
international organisations. 
Under the pro-EU coalition of New Democracy and PASOK led by Samaras in 2012-15, 
initiatives towards the Balkans were limited. This was due to a combination of factors: 
the bigger attention devoted to other foreign policy portfolios (the US, the Eastern 
Mediterranean)10; and the fact that the foreign ministry was led by Evangelos Venizelos, 
leader of PASOK and vice-president of the government who was much more consumed 
with domestic politics and the management of the austerity program.  
During this time Greece did not depart from its support for the European perspective of 
the Balkans, but its approach became more selective and utilitarian. The pro-EU 
coalition’s policy towards the Balkans was consumed with issues touching directly upon 
the national interest, such as the complications of the ratification of a treaty with 
Albania on demarcation of the two countries’ Exclusive Economic Zone by the 
government in Tirana. Reflecting however the embedding of Greek foreign policy in 
                                                     
7 Speech of Antonis Samaras in Parliament on foreign policy, 24 January 2011. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtvzJX9fntg (accessed 23 June 2017).  
8 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, 
Brussels, 13 May 2016. 
9 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
10 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016. 
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European processes and considerations and the government’s overall pro-EU bent, 
Athens also displayed elements of mounting Europeanisation of some of its policies, 
evidenced for example in Venizelos’ initiatives in warming relations with Kosovo11. 
The change of government in early 2015 from a pro-EU to an anti-austerity coalition of 
the radical left Syriza and the nationalist right Independent Greeks (ANEL) brought about 
major changes in a variety of policy areas. The new coalition’s expressed intention was 
to rebalance the relationship between Greece and the EU. By making direct references 
to national sovereignty, the Syriza-ANEL coalition expressed a far-reaching agenda of 
undoing the embedding of Greek policymaking in the European framework. The 
economy was of course the main area where this rebalancing was to take place, but 
during the same period a mistrust of European and external constraints, norms and 
procedures became evident in a wide range of public policy domains. The theme running 
through the new government’s actions was that Europeanisation of various policy areas 
did not just insulate elites from popular scrutiny, but compromised core interests of 
Greece.  
The appointment of Nikos Kotzias as the new foreign minister seemed to follow this logic 
of re-politicisation and scrutiny of Europeanisation of Greek policies. Kotzias, an ex-
advisor of George Papandreou who neither belonged to Syriza nor was an elected 
member of parliament, had positioned himself as a strong intellectual voice of the anti-
austerity camp. With regards to foreign policy, he had scrutinised Greece’s dependence 
on Europe and the West and had advocated for an ‘energetic and independent foreign 
policy’ to embrace the emergence of new poles in the international system (Kotzias 
2010). This attitude dovetailed with Syriza’s intention to explore alternative sources of 
financing and leverage vis-à-vis the EU, be it from Russia, China or elsewhere.  
High-profile foreign policy initiatives of the Syriza-ANEL government that interlinked 
with its opposition to austerity in the first half of 2015, such as Tsipras’ visit to Moscow 
to meet with Vladimir Putin, dovetailed with Kotzias’ earlier advocacy of a more 
independent foreign policy. A closer view at Kotzias’ actions however reveals a different 
picture, particularly as concerns areas that remained far from political scrutiny and 
contestation, such as the Balkans. Here Kotzias followed a policy that did not challenge 
Greece’s embedding in the EU framework.  
Indeed, Kotzias undertook initiatives particularly towards the two Balkan countries that 
Greece has the most complicated relations with – FYROM and Kosovo. With FYROM, 
Kotzias succeeded in establishing a dialogue process and agreeing on a set of confidence 
building measures. He also became the first Greek foreign minister to visit Skopje in 11 
years in June 2015. With Kosovo, Kotzias undertook even more impressive initiatives by 
becoming in July 2015 the first Greek foreign minister to visit Pristina and generally 
building on Venizelos’ cultivation of this relationship (Maksimovic 2016: 14-16). The 
Balkans has been the region where Kotzias has demonstrated the greatest activism.  
                                                     
11 According to a Greek diplomat, Venizelos seriously revisited Greece’s policy of non-recognition of 
Kosovo. Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016. 
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It is doubtful whether Kotzias’ policies reflect a sincere socialisation in the tenets of a 
Europeanised foreign policy and not his personal reading of the diplomatic situation12. 
But the fact remains that his initiatives aligned with Greece’s prior commitments and 
references to the EU framework, which privileges a careful promotion of national 
interests framed by an overall support for stability and the region’s European 
perspective. In both style and substance, Kotzias’ Balkan policy demonstrated an 
impressive degree of continuity with policies embedded in the EU framework of the 
previous 15 years, exhibited for example in the reserved tone with which Greece has 
responded to the heightened nationalist rhetoric of Rama and other elements in Tirana, 
which has received broad press coverage in Greece (Maksimovic 2016: 13-14), or the 
explosive political situation in Skopje. 
To be sure, Kotzias is trying to reestablish some degree of Greek influence in the region 
that was severely damaged due to economic weakness and political instability in Athens. 
But, as already discussed, Europeanisation of foreign policy does not mean a state giving 
up on its goals or national interests. What distinguishes Kotzias is that, unlike other 
policy areas during the first Syriza-ANEL coalition, he pursued the national interest 
largely in conjunction with EU procedures and principles even before Tsipras caved in to 
the EU in financing negotiations in summer 2015. Given challenges in the region, Kotzias’ 
diplomacy is much more careful than what an ‘independent and forceful foreign policy’ 
favoured by the anti-memorandum front’s nationalist ethos (present in ANEL, but also 
in parts of Syriza) would imply.  
On relations with FYROM in particular the sequence of events has been quite interesting. 
While in the beginning of the Eurozone crisis one could see the prospects of 
normalisation between Athens and Skopje as thwarted by the domestic situation in 
Greece13, the emergence of political instability in FYROM turned the tables. The 
authoritarianism of the Gruevski regime alerted the EU to the fact that severe 
resistances to FYROM’s European course exist inside the country as well, and that 
Greece’s obstruction had also been used as an excuse by a regime that was more 
nationalistic and illiberal than pro-European to begin with14. As the EU position evolved 
against Gruevski, it suddenly approached Greek understandings of the problem15. In the 
words of a Greek diplomat, Greek policy on FYROM became ‘inadvertently 
Europeanised’16. For the Syriza-ANEL coalition that since the summer of 2015 has 
succumbed to Eurozone pressures and is implementing a new austerity package, this 
alignment between Greek interests and EU positions was a welcome development17.  
                                                     
12 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
13 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
14 Interview with DG NEAR official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 14 May 
2016.  
15 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 13 May 2016. 
16 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016. 
17 However, with Gruevski removed from power in May 2017 and a new government in Skopje willing to 
discuss compromises on the name-issue in order to advance its EU and NATO bids, pressure may begin to 
mount on Greece again to soften its stance. 
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Kotzias’ policies towards the Balkans may seem contradictory from the perspective of 
the social embedding of foreign policy in Greece. His careful cultivation of difficult 
neighbors like Rama, the deepening of relations with Kosovo, and his dispassionate 
diplomacy towards the deep political crisis in FYROM may be seen as reflecting Syriza’s 
rejection of nationalism in the Balkans. But his overtures towards Kosovo contradict the 
earlier positions of Syriza against any recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral independence, 
a legacy of the Greek left’s opposition to US interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s 
(Syriza 2015). His initiatives have also evaded any intense scrutiny from Syriza’s coalition 
partner ANEL, a party with nationalistic positions on all foreign policy issues including 
relations with FYROM and Albania18. Whether Kotzias’ policies would enjoy public 
support if Greece’s Balkan policy were more present and actively scrutinised in the 
public realm is unclear.  
What all this seems to amount to is to reaffirm the insulation of Greek foreign policy 
from public scrutiny. Again, this may be less due to sincere acceptance of EU norms and 
priorities and more to Kotzias’ personalised leadership in a zealously demarcated policy 
fief – an effect further accentuated by the fact that he is neither an MP nor a member 
of Syriza. The fact that Greece’s Balkan policy had already been depoliticised and 
bureaucratised by pro-EU governments created a safe space within which Kotzias’ 
personalised and activist diplomacy could feed in. Here as well, we can speak of 
inadvertent Europeanisation of the foreign policy of an initially Eurosceptic government, 
and of a high degree of continuity of policy content and style towards the Balkans 
(Maksimovic 2016: 17). 
All these testify more generally to the steady process of downgrading of the post of 
Greek foreign minister during the crisis. Traditionally, a high-profile position in Greek 
politics that was usually occupied by politicians with high ambitions, the post of foreign 
minister has been banalised since 2010, due to the high turnover of holders (seven 
different foreign ministers from PASOK, New Democracy and Syriza, including one 
serving two separate one-month terms in caretaker governments), and its occupation 
by politicians of lower profile (with the exception of Venizelos). Kotzias represents some 
continuity with regards to the fact that foreign ministers have always had a high degree 
of discretion in their actions – a reflection of the personalisation and weakness of 
institutional procedures in the Greek state. But the high public salience of foreign policy 
was historically a major check on foreign ministers’ personal agendas. Today, however, 
what was once one of the most scrutinised domains of Greek public policy has receded 
substantially from public view and press coverage as attention shifted to economic and 
public policy issues, allowing the foreign minister to implement policy with little to no 
reference to broader public considerations.  
 
 
                                                     
18 Interview with DG NEAR official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.  
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6. Greek Foreign Policy and European Energy Security: From 
Challenge to Confirmation of Greece’s European Orientation 
An external dimension of European energy policy became increasingly relevant after the 
2006 Russia/Ukraine crisis, when Russia interrupted the supply of gas to Ukraine and by 
extension to the EU (Tekin and Williams 2009: 419; Umbach 2010: 1230). This raised the 
question of EU energy security, especially because the new member-states of Central-
Eastern Europe were overwhelmingly orientated towards Russia for their gas supplies 
(Correlje and van der Linde 2006: 532). Energy is an example of the post-Maastricht 
hybrid governance whereby intergovernmental characteristics were retained – EU 
member-states are allowed to develop their own energy policies with regards to type 
and sources of energy they prefer (Goldthau and Sitter 2014: 1455).  
But the EU has also developed a growing regulatory framework aimed at the 
liberalisation of the internal energy market. Thus, national priorities and preferences 
coexist with common European rules and norms. External energy policy is considered 
one of the least Europeanised among EU external policies (Wong and Hill 2012: 222). 
But the external dimension played a crucial role in expanding the EU’s visibility in a policy 
area where even its domestic liberalisation drives are met with national reticence (Jegen 
and Merand 2014: 189-190). Europeanisation of a policy area, like energy, may 
ultimately represent an instrumental view of the EU as promoter of national interests 
that member-states cannot fulfil (Kuzemko 2014: 67-68), and as a shaper of the EU’s 
periphery according to the standards and rules that member states already adhere to 
(Abbasov 2014). 
Energy policy in Greece contained tensions between Europeanised market-based and 
geopolitical visions of foreign policy from early on. The geopolitical vision of Greece’s 
energy policy as a zero-sum effort to increase Greece’s strategic importance vis-à-vis 
regional competitors and its European partners has been prominent in journalistic 
commentary and lay analyses of Greek foreign policy since energy began to emerge as 
an important issue in the late-2000s – perhaps because it tapped on antagonistic 
perceptions of Greece’s relations with its neighbors that had been subdued by the 
Europeanisation project but remained popular in Greek public opinion.  
Contrary to this view, policymakers and mainstream analysts (see e.g. Grigoriadis 2008) 
have held a more nuanced view of the significance of energy for Greek foreign policy. 
For them Greece’s importance lies in its function as a player of EU energy security, 
serving goals like the diversification of energy sources and supply routes into the EU. 
This strand of analysis has seen Greek goals as better served if couched within EU norms 
of ‘competition’, ‘markets’ and ‘efficiency’19. This means that the chief goal of increasing 
Greece’s importance can very well be achieved in cooperation with Greece’s 
neighbours, or accepting that that ambitious plans for participation in pipeline projects 
can be undercut by EU regulations on energy supply, market competition etc. 
                                                     
19 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016. 
  
 
16 
The juxtaposition of the Europeanised and the geopolitical energy perspectives 
highlights the contradictions of the ambition of turning Greece into an ‘energy hub’, a 
goal with broad political support. This goal entails Greece participating in all major 
pipeline projects in its region – EU-supported ones like TAP or Russia-led ones like South 
Stream – even if their ulterior political goals are competing20. But policymakers 
conscious of the framework within which Greece operates have embedded the ‘energy 
hub’ goal within the broader agenda of reliability of energy supply for the EU, despite 
the geopolitical connotations it evokes among Greek public opinion21. In this sense, 
pursuing Russian cooperation (even after deterioration of EU-Russia relations in 2014) 
is good for Greece’s international standing as long as it takes place within the confines 
of EU policy and rules22. The EU itself sees no problem in Greece wanting to become an 
energy hub, as long as its principle of differentiation of sources and routes is respected23. 
The popularity of the geopolitical energy narrative in Greece rested among others on its 
adversarial view of Turkey (Tsakiris 2014a: 17) and its implying a strategic alignment with 
Russia, a country that has long maintained an appeal among broad swaths of Greek 
society (on the importance of ‘special relationships’ of EU member states with third 
countries as antagonistic to Europeanisation see Wong and Hill 2012: 226). This 
contradicted the technical and largely bureaucratised nature of Europeanised energy 
policy. The Eurozone crisis only increased this tension. From early on in the crisis it was 
common for anti-austerity politicians and commentators to call on the Greek 
government to exploit (allegedly) massive energy resources in the Aegean and Ionian 
seas in order for Greece to escape its financial quandary. On the other side of the divide, 
it became imperative for pro-EU governments to show that Greece’s alignment with EU 
goals and norms could produce tangible economic benefits for the country as it plunged 
into depression24.  
Next to existing questions regarding pipeline politics in South-eastern Europe that cut 
across Greece’s relations with the EU, Russia and Turkey, from 2010 onwards the energy 
resources of the Eastern Mediterranean entered the calculations of EU energy policy. 
For Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean energy politics interacted with long-standing 
foreign policy considerations like the security of Cyprus and the regional influence of 
Turkey, as well as novel developments like the fallout between Turkey and Israel after 
the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 (Tsakiris 2014b).  
Here as well, the goals of increasing Greece’s influence as transit country for EU supplies 
and of increasing its geopolitical weight partially overlapped, but also partially 
contradicted each other. For example, there is a pertinent debate concerning the most 
efficient way to exploit EastMed energy resources. Some in Greece support the idea of 
                                                     
20 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016. 
21 Interview with Greek foreign policy expert, Athens, 15 June 2015. 
22 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016. Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 
14 June 2016. 
23 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 
2016. 
24 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016. 
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a pipeline connecting Cyprus with Greece (or alternatively of shipments of LNG from 
Cyprus to near Athens). But it is unclear if Cyprus has the amount of energy resources 
to support such a project (Tsakiris 2014a: 11-15)25. Instead, the EU may see as most 
efficient to foster a regional energy market that would include Turkey, which could also 
serve as the main transit country of the region’s gas into Europe26. This could make the 
most commercial sense and agree with principles of market efficiency that the EU is 
trying to externalise beyond its borders (Abbasov, 2014). But it also would contradict 
geopolitical readings of Greek energy policy that hold a more adversarial view of Turkey 
and constitute part of official Greek calculations27. 
For pro-EU governments in Athens during the crisis it became important to visibly and 
assertively pursue energy politics, while also maintaining a sensitive balance between 
public expectations of immediate geopolitical gains cultivated by the ‘energy hub’ 
rhetoric, and the limitations arising from the framework of EU energy policy. Energy 
became a way to demonstrate that a cultivation of the EU framework can help Greece 
achieve its goals, while it also was a way to bolster Greece’s standing among its EU 
partners. The importance of energy considerations can be gauged by the fact that, unlike 
the high turnaround of foreign ministers, successive governments in 2009-15, from 
PASOK’s government of George Papandreou to the technocratic government of Lucas 
Papademos to Antonis Samaras’s New Democracy-PASOK coalition, maintained the 
same minister for energy affairs (PASOK MP Giannis Maniatis, with a break in 2012-13 
when PASOK did not provide ministers to the government).  
With Antonis Samaras as Prime Minister, Greece pursued a particularly active energy 
policy in its neighbourhood and in the Eastern Mediterranean (Tsakiris 2014a). This was 
part of Samaras’ effort to construct a narrative of Greece as a beacon of stability in its 
region in order to offset its loss of status and clout among its EU partners. It entailed 
positioning Greece as an important transit country for Eastern Mediterranean energy 
resources, as well as pursuing opportunities both with EU-backed and Russia-backed 
pipeline projects. In some cases, the Greek government could showcase that an energy 
policy closely aligned with EU priorities indeed delivered dividends to Greece. This was 
the case when the TAP pipeline favoured by Greece was ultimately chosen by Azerbaijan 
as its preferred means of transportation of its gas to Europe. This was a major coup and 
a great example of how Greece could score points in the ‘pipeline wars’ (as Greek 
newspapers often call them) in South-eastern Europe by cultivating EU institutions and 
market players28, as well as by acting upon EU market-based principles and norms. 
                                                     
25 Interview with energy policy expert, Brussels, 10 May 2016. 
26 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 
2016.  
27 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016. 
28 Of course TAP also dovetails with the Europeanised framework of Greek foreign policy that views a 
reformed Turkey as a potential partner in a liberal regional order (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 
31 May 2016). This contradicts the purely geopolitical understanding of energy politics (particularly as 
expressed by nationalistic circles in Greece). But to the extent that the alternative pipeline to TAP 
(Nabucco) was completely unpalatable to Greece, the choice for TAP was ultimately a success for Greece 
regarding transportation of Azeri gas into the EU. 
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Indeed, the victory of TAP over its rival pipeline project (Nabucco) could be seen as the 
victory of sound market-based principles (Mikhelidze 2013)29. 
In other cases, however, the tension between Greek and EU energy policy became 
palpable, particularly with regards to EU objections to Russian-backed projects like the 
South Stream pipeline or the (ultimately aborted) purchase of the Greek gas utility by 
Gazprom (Tsakiris 2013). For the pro-EU elites that guided Greece through the crisis in 
2010-15 these apparently contradictory moves were part and parcel of a constant 
process of interaction and bargaining in EU settings. As one official deeply involved in 
energy policymaking during this period put it, ‘Europe is an arena of negotiation where 
you have to pursue your interests and strike bargains; nobody is a priori for or against 
you’30. For pro-EU governments during this period the EU offered a framework within 
which the importance of Greece as an energy player could be highlighted, and hence its 
strategic importance augmented. This entailed however also living with the fact that 
sometimes EU priorities or regulations contravened immediate Greek material and 
geopolitical priorities.  
The anti-austerity coalition of Syriza and ANEL that entered power in early 2015 took a 
very different view of energy policy. This was expected, particularly as the leader of ANEL 
Panos Kammenos had been one of the main proponents of the idea that energy 
resources, if cultivated purposefully and without interference by outsiders, could deliver 
Greece out of its economic conundrum. Kammenos expressed essentially an unabashed 
version of the geopolitical argument, including transparent nods to Russia as Greece’s 
preferred partner. The picture was further complicated by the fact that the new minister 
responsible for energy was Panagiotis Lafazanis, the leader of the hard-line anti-euro 
faction within Syriza. As in various other policy areas, the Syriza-ANEL coalition entered 
office with the aim of a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between national 
policymaking and EU membership, looking for immediate gains and assertion of 
independence. 
The new government made it clear that energy would become a way to help Greece 
escape austerity. This became particularly evident in the much-publicised visit of Alexis 
Tsipras to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin in April 2015. While Putin did not commit 
any serious sum of money to help Greece’s finances, perhaps the most important 
agreement signed was Greece’s participation in the new Turkish Stream pipeline project, 
which replaced South Stream as the main avenue of Russian gas into South-eastern 
Europe (Tagliapietra and Zachmann 2014). The rhetoric of Lafazanis at the time was 
explicitly antagonistic to EU principles and priorities31. Relevant EU policymakers were 
highly alarmed at his rhetoric32.  
Developments in Greece’s renegotiation with the Eurozone over the terms of its 
financing however changed the dynamics of energy policy as well. With Tsipras 
                                                     
29 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016. 
30 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016. 
31 Sarantis Michalopoulos, ‘Athens opposes EU energy strategy, blocks privatisations’, Euractiv.com, 20 March 2015. 
32 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. 
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ultimately accepting a new austerity package, the faction under Lafazanis left Syriza and 
formed a new anti-austerity party that failed to enter parliament in the September 2015 
snap elections. The Syriza-ANEL coalition was re-elected, only this time it was forced to 
accept a severe undercutting of national independence much like previous 
governments. In these new dynamics, the importance of energy policy changed again.  
Just like previous pro-EU governments, the government of Tsipras now saw the need to 
showcase that Europeanised policy had benefits for Greece after all. This became 
strikingly evident in the fanfare with which Tsipras inaugurated the Greek part of the 
TAP pipeline in Thessaloniki in May 2016, with many EU officials present. The change in 
tone was drastic, and as a high-ranking EEAS official noted, ‘Tsipras read Samaras’ 
speech at the inauguration’33. New Democracy, now in opposition, slyly remarked that 
Tsipras sought ownership of a project for which pro-EU governments had doggedly 
fought for in the years before Syriza came to power. 
In sum, in energy policy during the crisis pro-EU elites feeling the pressure from a 
worsening economy and a more Eurosceptic public opinion tried to pursue national 
goals in a more assertive manner, but by cultivating the EU framework in order to 
highlight Greece’s geopolitical role. This meant accepting limitations on national 
policymaking in the knowledge that Greece could maximise its influence and gains if it 
still managed to present its preferences as compatible with those of the EU – a classical 
process of back-and-forth between uploading and downloading. Anti-austerity forces on 
the other hand, took a much more voluntaristic view of energy policy as a tool of 
geopolitics and a bargaining chip in Greece’s relationship with the Eurozone. This was 
very much the approach of the Tsipras government during its ‘renegotiation’ phase in 
the first half of 2015. But once it succumbed to austerity, it felt the need to use energy 
as a positive example of Europeanisation after all, lauding the benefits of EU projects 
like TAP for Greece’s position as a regional energy player.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper conceptualised Europeanisation of foreign policy as an aspect of the overall 
Europeanisation of European states, whose main implication is the de-politicisation of 
state-society relations. I have argued that the Eurozone crisis, beyond its very tangible 
economic consequences, can also be seen as an instance of intense re-politicisation and 
contestation of national political and administrative elites’ embedding in transnational 
and supranational policymaking processes in the EU and of their sheltering from 
domestic societal demands. This conceptualisation makes it easier to think how 
developments in economic policy affect other policy areas, and how dynamics of 
popular contestation and re-politicisation spill over from one area to the other. 
 
At the same time, this paper also speaks to the mainstream literature on 
Europeanisation, particularly as this literature has always acknowledged the importance 
                                                     
33 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016. 
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of domestic political and social dynamics for the pace, depth and content of 
Europeanisation of national structures. The Eurozone crisis has upset much of the pro-
European permissive consensus in many EU member states. These new political and 
social dynamics cut across uploading and downloading in foreign policy, making foreign 
policy-specific mechanisms more complex and open-ended. 
 
The findings on Greece’s Balkan and energy security policies agree generally with the 
findings of Stavridis et al (2015) about a discernible de-Europeanisation of Greek foreign 
policy in the first five years of the crisis. But I understand here this de-Europeanisation 
less in terms of concrete policy outcomes that signal a retreat from EU standards and 
norms, than as a complication of policymaking in the context of partisan realignment, 
social polarisation and intensified scrutiny by a society sceptical once again of whether 
national interests and European commitments truly align.  
 
Under pro-EU pro-austerity governments in 2010-15, this was expressed in a variety of 
ways: curtailing the space for compromise with FYROM, or pursuing a multifaceted 
energy security policy with clear geopolitical overtones that clashed with EU norms and 
priorities on various occasions. The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy had always 
been less a sincere socialisation than a more sophisticated way to pursue the national 
interest, but in the years of the crisis even pro-European elites had to reassert that Greek 
goals can (and must) be served via the EU framework. This was important in the face of 
a public opinion that was induced by the crisis to think once again of foreign policy in 
terms of ‘outside pressures’ on Greece to accept unwarranted ‘compromises’. 
 
At this point, however, I would qualify and go beyond the de-Europeanisation argument 
of Stavridis et al. First, even during the Eurozone crisis, processes of Europeanisation in 
depoliticised policy realms continued. Greece instituted a rapprochement with Kosovo, 
and took great care to embed its energy ambitions in South-eastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean within the framework of EU energy security needs. Second, one 
can observe instances of inadvertent Europeanisation. What was once considered in the 
EU intransigent Greek policy towards FYROM suddenly became mainstream EU analysis 
in the face of severe democratic backsliding and nationalism in Skopje. And TAP, once a 
marginal project desperately promoted by Greece and Italy, was ultimately chosen over 
the EU-sponsored Nabucco pipeline, thus making Greece an integral part of the EU’s 
Southern Corridor.  
 
Third, and most important, the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis itself pulled Greek 
foreign policy back towards the logic of Europeanised policymaking. The coming to 
power of an anti-austerity coalition in early 2015 signalled the apex of the re-
politicisation of the relationship between Greece and the EU. In foreign policy, this was 
expressed in the instrumentality with which foreign policy issues were pursued within 
the general framework of ‘renegotiation’ of Greece’s financing from the Eurozone. 
Energy was the most visible area of this, with the Syriza-ANEL coalition expressly seeing 
Russian-backed energy projects as leverage in its relationship with the EU.  
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Yet, even in this early phase the new coalition did not move full-steam toward complete 
de-Europeanisation of foreign policy. In another case of inadvertent Europeanisation, 
Syriza’s ideological legacy of leftist internationalism informed a cooperative approach 
towards the Balkans, which was generally in line with Greece’s Europeanised policy 
towards the region as had existed before the crisis. This created space for new foreign 
minister Kotzias to deepen contacts with the region and talk up its European 
perspective. 
 
More dramatically, the surrender of Tsipras to Greece’s creditors and the re-election of 
the Syriza-ANEL coalition on an austerity platform in September 2015 created the 
conditions for a re-Europeanisation effect. The re-politicisation experiment of 2015 and 
its failure intensified the impression that had set in since the beginning of the crisis that 
foreign policy was derivative and dependent on Greece’s economic relations with the 
EU. The Syriza-ANEL coalition intensified the subordination of foreign policy to economic 
ends, so much so that with its capitulation on the economic front the main parameters 
of foreign policy fell again in line with the EU, in some cases even more pronouncedly 
than in the past. Foreign policy thus turned from a field of contestation to a legitimising 
mechanism, where the benefits of ‘Europe’ can be demonstrated and underpin Greece’s 
continuous (although never seamless) adaptation to the demands of EU membership. 
Tsipras’s celebration of the TAP pipeline in May 2016 in Thessaloniki was a visible 
example of this.  
 
For Greece of course re-Europeanisation is not synonymous to ‘European policy’. 
Rather, ostensibly radical and populist forces have been successfully absorbed into the 
logic of the pursuit of national goals in and via Europe. Ironically, this presages further 
conflict with the EU framework further down the line and does not solve any of the 
historical contradictions between Greek and EU foreign policy. A left-wing party such as 
Syriza for example could be well-placed to cultivate the EU’s increasing shift of focus 
towards decarbonisation34 and away from mega-projects like pipelines35. But Syriza’s 
legacy of instrumentalising energy for political purposes, along with the Greek state’s 
longstanding geopolitical goals, ensure that Greek foreign policy will remain focused on 
pipeline politics and the ambition to turn Greece into an energy hub for a long time. By 
the same token, Syriza would be ideologically better-placed to pursue a solution of the 
Macedonia name issue, but this looks impossible given the coalition’s reliance on ANEL 
support.  
 
Given the complicated matrix created by the goals of the Greek state and its 
commitment to EU integration, once anti-austerity parties now in office have few tools 
in their disposal to manage the contradictions of complex policy issues outside of 
Europeanised – i.e. depoliticised and bureaucratised – policymaking. As one Greek 
diplomat put it, ‘it was the crisis that brought Syriza to power and it was the crisis that 
tamed it’36. 
                                                     
34 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016. 
35 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. 
36 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016.  
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